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1 Introduction
In recent years, the two largest countries in Asia,
China and India have become increasingly
important players in the global economy. Their
rapid growth and increased openness since 1990
has led to concerns in both developed and
developing countries, but up to now relatively little
attention has been paid to their impact on the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, despite the fact
that trade between the Asian Drivers
1
and Africa
has grown significantly since 1990 and that in the
last few years, China and India have also emerged
as sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
region.
The direct impacts of the growth of China and
India on Africa can take a number of different forms.
First, there may be an increase in exports from Africa
to the two Asian economies. Second, African
imports from China and India are likely to increase
significantly. Third, there may be increased
competition between the Asian Drivers and some
African economies in third markets which could
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Figure 1: Africa’s trade with China and India, 1990–2003
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (ESDS International, University of Manchester).
have a negative impact on African exports. Finally,
there may be effects on foreign direct investment
to Africa, either negative if investment from third
countries is diverted to China or India, or positive
if China and India become significant sources of
FDI in Africa.
There may also be indirect impacts of China and
India’s growth on the African economies. For
example, the increased demand in the Asian
economies for imports from developed countries
has multiplier effects in those countries which in
turn lead to more demand in the developed
countries for African exports. Alternatively, the
growth of demand for primary commodities in
China and India may push up prices which benefit
primary commodity exporters, even if they do not
have any direct exports to those countries, but can
also be a disadvantage for other developing countries
who are net importers of the products concerned.
These indirect impacts are beyond the scope of this
article, which sets out to document the major direct
impacts of the Asian Drivers on 21 sub-Saharan
countries.
2 China and India’s economic
relations with Africa
Economic links between China and India are not
new but both countries’ trade with Africa has
increased significantly in recent years.
Figure 1 shows the growth of total trade between
Africa and the Asian Drivers since 1990. This shows
a slow growth in the first half of the 1990s, which
accelerated during the second half of the decade
particularly after 1998. Since 2000, China has
overtaken India as a trade partner for Africa. Figure 1
also indicates that whereas Africa has always had
a trade surplus with India, it has run a deficit with
China, although this has narrowed considerably
since 1998 as a result of the rapid growth of exports
to China.
Figure 2 illustrates trade with China and India
as a share of Africa’s total trade over the same period.
The relative significance of both exports and imports
between Africa and the two Asian economies
increased substantially over the period, although
the share of Africa’s exports going to India fell
between 2000 and 2003.
In addition to trade, there is a history of Indian
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Figure 2: Share of China and India in Africa’s trade, 1900–2003
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (ESDS International, University of Manchester).
investment in Africa, particularly in East Africa
where there were significant expatriate Indian
communities. More recently, China has also taken
an increased interest in the region, reflected in a
number of major new investments. Some analysts
predict that China will be one of the top three
investors on the continent by the end of the decade
(The Economist 2004).
3 Exports from Africa to China and
India
The rapid growth of Chinese and Indian imports
have offered market opportunities to exporters
around the world and as was seen above, Africa has
also benefited in terms of export growth. In this
section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of the
extent to which individual African countries have
participated in this expansion and the types of
products involved.
Table 1 shows that the extent to which African
countries are involved in exporting to China and
India varies considerably from case to case. In 2003,
exports to China were particularly significant for
Sudan (41 per cent of total exports) and Angola
(23 per cent), but of the remaining 19 countries,
only Somalia exported more than 5 per cent of its
total exports to China. Exports to India were around
10 per cent or more of total exports for four
countries, Senegal (13 per cent), Somalia (12 per
cent) and Nigeria and Tanzania (10 per cent each).
None of the other countries covered in this study
exported more than 5 per cent to India.
What are the major types of products exported
from Africa to China and India? Not surprisingly,
given Africa’s traditional comparative advantage
and China’s booming demand for energy and natural
resources to fuel its industrial growth, the bulk of
African exports to China are minerals, petroleum
and timber.
Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sudan are significant exporters of crude
petroleum to meet China’s demand for energy.
Cameroon and Congo, along with Mozambique
and Tanzania are exporters of wood, while Ghana,
Namibia and Zambia supply non-ferrous base
metals, which are important raw materials for
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Table 1: Share of China and India in exports of 21 African countries, 2003 (%)
China India Total
Angola 23.2 0.0 23.2
Botswana 0.1 0.0 0.1
Cameroon 4.4 0.3 4.7
Congo (Democratic Republic of) 2.2 0.0 2.2
Ethiopia 0.7 1.2 1.9
Ghana 1.6 1.3 2.9
Kenya 0.3 1.4 1.7
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malawi 0.0 0.7 0.7
Mozambique 2.3 2.1 4.4
Namibia 2.9 0.1 2.9
Nigeria 0.5 9.9 10.4
Rwanda 4.2 0.0 4.2
Senegal 1.4 13.0 14.4
Sierra Leone 0.0 4.0 4.0
Somalia 5.6 11.7 17.3
South Africa 4.6 4.2 8.8
Sudan 40.9 3.0 43.9
Tanzania 2.6 9.9 12.5
Uganda 0.2 0.2 0.4
Zambia 1.7 3.6 5.3
Source: IMF (ESDS International, University of Manchester), Direction of Trade Statistics and COMTRADE.
China’s booming industrial sector. In all cases, the
exports involve very limited processing within the
African countries. The only exceptions to this are
exports of iron and steel and steel products from
South Africa. The only other product to feature
significantly in China’s imports from Africa is cotton
from Cameroon, Sudan and Tanzania to supply the
demand for cotton from the rapidly growing
Chinese textile industry. China has not been able
to meet the demand domestically because of the
decline in the area planted to cotton as farmers
switch to more profitable crops.
As can be seen in Figure 1, India’s imports from
Africa are now lower than China’s and have been
considerably less dynamic in recent years. The
pattern of imports is not so clear cut either.
Mozambique is important as an exporter of fruit
and nuts to India as are Ghana, Nigeria and
Tanzania. Sudan is primarily important as an
exporter of cotton. Zambia and Tanzania export
precious stones. Senegal has large exports of
phosphoric acid, while South Africa’s main export
to India is gold.
It is likely that China and India will become
increasingly important export markets for the
African economies over the next decade. Rising
incomes will also change the structure of demand
in China and India. Increasing levels of per capita
income will lead to a growing demand for food,
particularly those with high income elasticity such
as meat products, fish, fruit and beverages. The
growing demand for meat in China has already led
to increased imports of animal feedstuffs from Latin
America in recent years. There may be new
opportunities for other agricultural exports from
Africa such as coffee and sugar. China and India’s
industrial production will also continue to expand,
leading to further increased demand for raw
materials and energy which already figure
significantly among exports from several sub-Sahara
African (SSA) countries.
There are several countries among the 21
included here which have so far developed very
limited trade links with China or India. Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda export less than 1 per
cent of their total exports to the two Asian
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Table 2: Imports from China and India as a share of total imports, 2003 (%)
China India Total
Angola 3.5 1.5 5.1
Botswana 0.9 0.2 1.2
Cameroon 4.8 1.7 6.6
Congo (Democratic Republic of) 2.7 1.0 3.6
Ethiopia 6.4 3.2 9.6
Ghana 9.1 4.6 13.8
Kenya 6.4 5.8 12.2
Lesotho 2.2 0.5 2.7
Malawi 1.9 6.3 8.2
Mozambique 2.8 3.7 6.4
Namibia 1.9 0.3 2.3
Nigeria 7.1 2.5 9.7
Rwanda 1.1 1.6 2.7
Senegal 2.7 2.2 4.8
Sierra Leone 3.1 2.3 5.4
Somalia 1.0 9.7 10.7
South Africa 5.9 1.5 7.5
Sudan 14.2 4.2 18.5
Tanzania 9.1 7.6 16.7
Uganda 5.1 7.4 12.6
Zambia 2.7 2.2 5.0
Source: Authors’ own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
economies, while Ethiopia and Kenya export less
than 2 per cent (see Table 1). These may have
unexploited export opportunities, which should
be explored. This is supported by the analysis of
the International Trade Centre, which identifies
potential for increased exports from Ethiopia and
Kenya to both China and India and from Uganda
to India.
2
4 Imports from China and India
As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, African imports
from China and India increased significantly from
1990 onwards and particularly since 1997. Table 2
shows that by 2003, there were six SSA countries
for which China and India together accounted for
more than 10 per cent of their total imports, namely
Ghana, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and
Uganda. Two more countries, Ethiopia and Nigeria
were just below the 10 per cent mark. If there are
significant effects from imports from the Asian
Drivers, they are most likely to be found in these
countries.
Virtually all the exports from China to the main
African importing countries are made up of
manufactured goods. The vast majority of Indian
exports to the region are also manufacturers with
the exception of Somalia, which imported a
significant quantity of sugar from India in 2003.
Imports cover a wide range of manufactures and
are not confined to labour-intensive products such
as garments and footwear.
The growth of imports from China and India
can have a dual effect. Where they compete with
domestic production, they may have a negative
effect on local manufacturers leading to reduced
output, plant closures and job losses. On the other
hand, the increased availability of cheap Chinese
or Indian goods tends to reduce prices to the benefit
of local consumers. While orthodox economics
suggests that the gains in consumer welfare will
outweigh the loss to producers in the long run, it
has to be recognised that increased import
competition may have negative impacts at least in
the short term and, where structural rigidities
The Asian Drivers and Sub-Saharan Africa
27
Table 3: Export Similarity Index (ESI) between exports of 18 African countries and China
and India (%)
Year China India
Botswana 2001 5.8 20.1
Cameroon 2003 6.6 11.7
Ethiopia 2003 4.3 9.3
Ghana 2000 10.6 13.0
Kenya 2003 19.3 27.9
Lesotho 2002 17.8 13.0
Malawi 2003 10.6 12.4
Mozambique 2002 6.4 11.5
Namibia 2003 18.7 29.1
Nigeria 2003 1.7 0.8
Rwanda 2003 8.8 14.2
Senegal 2003 14.5 23.4
Sierra Leone 2002 4.5 4.8
South Africa 2003 27.7 40.2
Sudan 2003 2.6 10.1
Tanzania 2003 11.0 20.6
Uganda 2003 8.0 12.3
Zambia 2002 11.0 17.3
Source: Authors’ own elaboration from COMTRADE data.
Note: Based on 2003 export data for China and India, and the latest available date for the African countries.
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia were omitted because of the lack of three-digit SITC
data on exports for any year from 2000 onwards.
prevent rapid reallocation of resources, these may
persist for a considerable period of time.
Of course if increased imports from China and
India are mainly at the expense of other exporters,
then the negative impacts on local producers will
be much less and the net benefits from cheaper
imports much greater. Some preliminary evidence
suggests that, particularly in the case of China,
increased imports have been mainly at the expense
of imports from other countries, so that the effect
on employment domestically was likely to be muted
(Jenkins and Edwards 2005: Table 6.3).
3
China will continue to expand its exports of
manufactured goods to the African countries in the
foreseeable future, as will India. As China upgrades
its technological capabilities, it is likely to be
competitive in a wider range of industries. This is
only likely to be a threat to local producers in South
Africa, with its relatively sophisticated industrial
sector and much less so in other SSA countries.
5 Competition in third markets
Compared with some other developing countries,
particularly those in South-East and South Asia
which have specialised in exports of labour-intensive
manufactures in recent years, it seems likely that
African countries would be less threatened by
competition from China and India. As Wood (2002)
has shown, African exports tend to be land/natural
resource intensive rather than labour intensive.
This suggests that for most African countries, the
structure of their exports is likely to be quite different
from that of China or India and unlikely therefore
to face a competitive threat in third markets. On
the other hand, recent reports from Lesotho that
the elimination of Multifibre Arrangement (MFA)
quotas has led to the closing down of a number of
factories and the loss of almost 10,000 jobs shows
that not all African countries are unaffected by Asian
competition (Peta 2005).
A standard measure of the extent to which the
exports of two countries are likely to compete with
each other is the Export Similarity Index (ESI).
4
Table 3 shows the Index between the exports of
each of the 18 African countries covered and China
and India, respectively using the latest data available.
The Index can vary between 100 per cent when
two countries have identical export structures and
0 when they do not have any exports which are
common to both. Table 3 confirms the view that
African countries generally have a rather low
similarity of exports with China and India.
5
As a
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Table 4: Proportion of exports facing competition from China and India (%)
Year China India
Botswana 2001 6.0 89.9
Cameroon 2003 23.8 5.6
Ethiopia 2003 17.8 7.6
Ghana 2000 32.3 7.5
Kenya 2003 33.8 25.4
Lesotho 2002 89.1 6.8
Malawi 2003 64.0 25.2
Mozambique 2002 73.4 16.7
Namibia 2003 55.4 18.4
Nigeria 2003 2.0 0.1
Rwanda 2003 7.8 30.2
Senegal 2003 44.1 32.7
Sierra Leone 2002 5.4 0.8
South Africa 2003 54.4 18.1
Sudan 2003 2.2 79.5
Tanzania 2003 26.3 13.0
Uganda 2003 35.5 2.2
Zambia 2002 82.4 11.3
Source: Calculated from Financial Times, 19 July 2005, and Planning Commissiion (2004).
point of comparison, the ESI between China and
India was 40.8 per cent, which was matched only
by that between South Africa and India. Estimates
of the ESI between China and some other Asian
countries for 2002 were considerably higher than
those between China and any African economy.
6
Although a low ESI indicates that two countries
have very different export structures, where the
countries have very different levels of exports, this
is not a good indicator of the extent to which the
exports of the small country faces competition.
Because of the difference between the scale of
exports from China/India and those of the African
countries, an African country may face considerable
competition from China/India in the world market
for a product which accounts for a high proportion
of the African country’s exports, but this is not
reflected in the ESI because the product accounts
for a relatively small share of China/India’s far more
diversified exports.
7
An alternative approach is to identify those
products in which China and India are likely to be
significant competitors in international markets
and to see what proportion these represent of the
exports of the African countries. In order to do this,
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
three-digit classes in which the share of China or
India in world exports increased by 1 per cent or
more between 1990 and 2002 were considered as
products in which other countries were likely to
face increased competition in third markets.
8
China
increased its world market share by this amount in
140 products, while India did so in 31 out of a total
of 237 three-digit categories.
Table 4 shows the proportion of each country’s
exports which are in SITC three-digit categories in
which China and India increased their share of the
world market. These figures are likely to be high-
end estimates for several reasons. First, the level of
aggregation may hide the fact that different products
are exported from the African and Asian countries.
Thus, for example, the very high share of Botswana’s
exports which face competition from India reflects
the significance of exports of SITC 667 (pearls,
precious and semi-precious stones). At a more
disaggregated level, Botswana’s exports are almost
entirely of rough diamonds (66721) whereas India
exports cut and worked diamonds (66729). Exports
may also be directed to different countries so that
African exports do not compete directly with those
of the Asian countries. Thus a more careful analysis
is required before definitive conclusions can be
arrived at regarding the extent to which a country’s
exports is threatened by China or India.
In contrast to the ESI, the data in Table 4
indicates that for most countries, China represents
a greater threat to exports than India. This is hardly
surprising given that China has increased its share
of world exports of far more products than India.
It serves to reinforce the point that the ESI may not
be a very good indicator of the extent to which a
country’s exports face competition.
Looking to the future, China will continue to be
highly competitive in manufacturing. As the economy
becomes more technologically sophisticated, it will
broaden the range of manufactures in which it is
internationally competitive. However, given the vast
army of unskilled labour available in China, it is
unlikely that such upgrading will lead to a withdrawal
from exports of unskilled labour-intensive products.
9
India, which up to now has not had the same impact
on global markets for manufactured goods as China,
is likely to become increasingly competitive in the
future. Its exports are predicted to be concentrated
in unskilled labour-intensive manufactures (Wood
and Calandrino 2001).
Although the limited extent to which African
countries have developed exports of labour-
intensive manufactures means that the immediate
negative effects on production and employment of
increased competition from China and India will
be less than for some Asian countries, it may make
it more difficult for them to develop such industries
in the future. Given the important role played by
sectors such as clothing and footwear in launching
industrialisation in many countries in the past, this
may prove a barrier to accelerating growth in sub-
Saharan Africa in the future.
6 Impacts on foreign direct
investment
As noted in the introduction, the growth of China
and India could potentially have two types of
impacts on FDI in other developing countries. On
the one hand, there is a fear that the attraction which
the Asian Drivers represent for foreign capital will
lead to a diversion of investment from other
destinations. On the other hand, there is recognition
of the fact that China and India have begun to invest
overseas themselves and may become an important
source of capital.
The first question is whether the inflow of FDI
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to China and India since 1990 has involved a
diversion of capital at the expense of developing
countries in Africa. There are two reasons why
diversion might be more likely for FDI into China.
One is that FDI into China is so much larger than
FDI into India. The second is that FDI into China
is much more strongly linked with export
production and might be considered relatively
footloose. In China, about two-thirds of FDI goes
to the manufacturing sector and foreign affiliates
account for half of exports (Gottschalk 2005: 10),
whereas in India, foreign affiliates account for less
than 10 per cent of India’s manufacturing exports.
The case for diversion of FDI into both China
and India is weak however, because much of the
FDI in Africa is in search of natural resources and
is therefore location-specific. Furthermore, FDI
into India is to a considerable extent in information
and communication technology (especially in
Bangalore) (UNCTAD 2003), which requires an
educated labour force. Finally, as we have seen,
there is generally little competition in third markets
between India and China on the one hand and
African countries on the other. The conclusion is
that, for sub-Saharan Africa in general, the
diversionary effect of FDI inflows into both China
and India is small.
The second question is how significant are FDI
flows from China and India for the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, there is only
limited data available on the scale of such flows.
FDI outflows from China and India have been small
compared with the countries’ inflows. Total annual
FDI outflows averaged US$3bn from China and
US$1bn from India per year between 2000 and
2003 (UNCTAD 2004a: 24). The outflow from
China between 2000 and 2003 was less than 0.5
per cent of the world total. China’s stock of FDI
held in other countries in 2003 was also less than
0.5 per cent of the world total and India’s was even
smaller (UNCTAD 2004a: 382). Thus both China
and India have played a much smaller role in
exporting FDI than in importing it and the
conclusion is that the effect of outward FDI from
China on developing countries in Africa has so far
been slight, relative to the effects of trade.
However, given the lack of success of the region
in attracting FDI generally, it is possible that the
Asian Drivers are making a significant contribution
to the total inflow to particular African countries.
Table 5 provides a rough indication of the relative
significance of China and Asia in relation to the
stock of FDI in the countries where they have the
largest investments. For most countries, FDI from
China represents only around 1 per cent of the total
stock, with the exception of Zambia where it is 6 per
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Table 5: China and India’s share in FDI stock in selected African economies
Total inward FDI stock (2002) Of which China
(US$m) (US$m)
*
Share (%)
Cameroon 1505 16 1.1
Ghana 1610 19 1.2
Mozambique 1505 15 1.0
Nigeria 22,570 44 0.2
South Africa 29,611 125 0.4
Tanzania 2,335 41 1.8
Zambia 2,241 134 6.0
Total (2003) (US$m) Of which India
(US$m)* Share (%)
Sudan 4033 912 22.6
Source: UNCTAD (2004a: 298–99) and CABC (2004: Table 2).
*
Cumulative value of investment from China (1979–2002) in Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, and
from India (1996–2003) in Sudan. Value to the end of 2001 for China’s investment in Cameroon, Ghana and
Mozambique.
cent. Indian investment in Sudan however, is highly
significant accounting for over one-fifth of all FDI.
The share of the two Asian countries in the total
stock may underestimate the contribution made
by new inflows.
Oil is by far the most important sector of FDI
into Africa from the Asian Drivers. India’s major
investment in the region is the state-owned Oil and
Natural Gas Commission Ltd’s stake in a Sudanese
oil field (UNCTAD 2004b: 8). China’s involvement
in Africa is also heavily geared towards oil and it
too has recently made a significant investment in
Sudan (The Economist 2004). China has also invested
in minerals in the region, particularly in the Zambian
copper industry, and has some investment in
manufacturing in the region including textiles in
Nigeria, food and beverages in Ghana and electric
appliances in Mozambique (CABC 2004). However,
in general, as with trade, China and India’s
investment relationship with Africa is dominated
by extractive activities.
The World Investment Report 2004 expects outward
investment from China to increase as the government
has relaxed restrictions on investment, partly to ease
the pressure of rising international reserves on the
exchange rate (UNCTAD 2004a: 20). The
Government of China has recently expressed a strong
political commitment towards Africa and has stated
its intention to give preferential treatment on trade
from the least-developed sub-Sahara African countries
and, together with the UNDP, has established a
China–Africa Business Council (CABC 2004) to
promote trade with, and FDI in, Africa. Chinese FDI
has grown rapidly over the four years up to 2002
with Africa representing 10 per cent of the total
(CABC 2004: 4) and some commentators predict
that China could be one of the top three investors
on the continent within five years (The Economist
2004). These investments are likely to continue to
be predominantly in natural resources.
Similarly, outward FDI from India is expected
to grow rapidly as restrictions on FDI abroad are
relaxed by the Indian Government (UNCTAD
2004b). In the recent past, India’s outward FDI has
been in the manufacturing and service sectors
(UNCTAD 2004b). Such investment is unlikely to
go to SSA but the pattern of India’s outward FDI is
widely believed to be changing. With India
importing 70 per cent of its oil needs, securing
natural resources is becoming an important driver
for Indian outward FDI (Gottschalk 2005:13;
UNCTAD 2004b). Thus FDI into SSA is likely to
increase from both China and India, but most such
investments are likely to be in oil and mining.
7 Conclusion
Although the impact of the Asian Drivers on sub-
Saharan Africa has received much less attention
than the impact of China on other Asian countries
or on Latin America, this article shows that for some
African countries these impacts are by no means
negligible and are likely to become more important
in the foreseeable future. The ways in which Africa
has been affected differs from country to country.
Some, such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, are
important exporters to either China or India so that
the major impact on them has been through the
growth of exports. However, the most significant
impact in Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda has been as a result of increased imports
from China. Although the profile of exports from
sub-Saharan Africa is very different from that of
China, there are some countries which may suffer
from increased competition from China in third
markets. The most obvious example is Lesotho, but
other countries such as Mozambique and Zambia
may also be negatively affected.
This article has only been able to set out the main
channels through which the Asian Drivers are
having an effect on sub-Saharan Africa. There is
clearly a need for more detailed research both on
individual countries and at the level of particular
value chains in order to trace through the impacts
within Africa of the growing integration of China
and India in the global economy.
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Notes
* This article draws on a report prepared by the authors
for the Department for International Development
(Jenkins and Edwards 2005). The views expressed in this
article are those of the authors and should not be regarded
as reflecting the views of the DFID.
1. The term ‘Asian Drivers’ is used to describe the two large,
dynamic Asian economies, China and India.
2. The ITC website, www.itcen.org estimates trade potential
using a model TradeSim, version 2 for a number of
countries. Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi, the other
countries mentioned here, are not included by the ITC.
3. This conclusion is derived from aggregate trade data. It
is possible that for specific products or groups of products,
imports from China have displaced domestic production.
A more detailed analysis of the imports of the African
countries at the product level or for groups of products
would be required to explore this further.
4. The ESI is calculated from the share of each three-digit
SITC product in the total exports of each country. It is the
sum of the minimum value of the share of each product.
ESI = ∑
i
MIN(X
i1
X
i2
) where X is the share of a commodity
in exports, i is the three-digit industry and 1 and 2 are the
two countries for which the index is being calculated.
5. Comparison of the two columns in Table 3 suggests that
Africa’s export structure is more like that of India than
China.
6. The ESI with China was 47.0 per cent for Indonesia, 38.2
per cent for Vietnam and 31.6 per cent for Pakistan.
7. Most African economies’ exports are concentrated in a
small number of products, while the exports of China
and India are far more diversified. For the products that
an African country exports, the value entering the ESI is
likely to be the share of that product in China/India’s
exports, which may be quite low, while for products that
the African country does not export, the value will be
zero. Thus, although China/India may be significant
competitors in world markets for the products exported
by the African country, this is not necessarily reflected in
a high ESI.
8. The increase in China/India’s share of the world market
was chosen as a criterion, rather than the rate of growth
of exports, to avoid the inclusion of products in which a
high rate of growth reflected a very small initial share of
world exports from China/India.
9. In the longer term, demographic change in China as a
result of the one child policy and increased educational
levels will mean that it will eventually lose its comparative
advantage in labour-intensive manufactures but this is
unlikely within the time frame being considered here.
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